The Quack’s Cure: Somaliland’s Misdiagnosis of the Awdal-Selel Crisis
The poetic Somali dictum, “Cudurka kaa Galla fardaha haddii laga gubo Dameer dawada lama gaadhayee” (The medicine for a horse, if applied to a donkey, will never reach the disease), is a stark warning against the folly of misapplied solutions. It speaks to a fundamental truth: treating a distinct ailment with an irrelevant remedy does not heal; it aggravates. This timeless wisdom serves as the perfect lens through which to examine the current crisis in the Awdal and Selel regions of the self-declared republic of Somaliland. The administration in Hargeisa, by persistently diagnosing a problem of inter-communal violence while ignoring the underlying malignancy of its own unjust governance and marginalization of the Issa community, is prescribing the wrong medicine for the wrong disease. This approach, far from resolving the conflict, is a dangerous act of political quackery that will inevitably lead to deeper tensions, greater bloodshed, and an unbridgeable rift between communities and the state.
The crisis in Awdal and Selel is not a spontaneous outbreak of clan warfare; it is a symptom of a chronic and festering infection of political exclusion of some. The present turbulence is a direct consequence of the Somaliland government’s systematic marginalization of the Issa community, a group that has historically faced discrimination in access to resources, political representation, development and basic services. By framing the conflict as a purely communal dispute between the Issa and the Gadaburdi, the Hargeisa administration engages in a cynical act of deflection. It conveniently absolves itself of any responsibility for the structural injustices that have ignited the fires of discontent. To demand that the Gadabursi community “settle problems” with the Issa is to demand that a bandage fix a broken bone. It is a clear abdication of the state’s primary duty: to provide justice and equitable governance for all its citizens.
Just as a quack prescribes horse medicine to cure a donkey as per the dictum, the Somaliland administration has championed a series of initiatives that target the symptoms, not the cause. The mediation conference in Gerisa, the roundtable discussions in Jigjiga and Hargeisa, and the latest Guurti delegation to Dire Dawa are all well-intentioned efforts, yet they are fundamentally misguided. These initiatives are premised on the erroneous belief that dialogue between the two communities alone can restore peace. However, what can the Gadabursi community offer to the Issa community that only the government can provide? They cannot grant political rights, reverse land-grabbing policies, and ensure equitable representation. The grievances of the Issa community are not directed at their neighbors- Gadabursi- but at the state in Hargeisa that has failed them. To hold these conferences without addressing the root causes, the state oppression, is akin to “case iska waal”—an exercise in futile and senseless activity that only serves to buy time while the real problem festers. It is a performative gesture of peace that masks a deep-seated unwillingness to undertake meaningful political reforms.
The consequences of this disastrous voluntary or involuntary misdiagnosis are already apparent and will only intensify conflict or crises. By refusing to confront its own injustices and shifting the burden of peace onto local communities, the Somaliland government is actively provoking more serious tensions. The Issa community, feeling the weight of state oppression and the futility of the prescribed remedies, will only become more radicalized. Their trust in any process mediated by a partial entity they see as their oppressor will evaporate entirely. Furthermore, by casting the Gadabursi as the primary interlocutors, the government unfairly places them in a precarious position, turning them into buffers and potential targets for the grievances of their neighbors-the Issa. This strategy does not build bridges; it destroys and sows deeper seeds of suspicion and resentment between communities, creating a dangerous dynamic where local conflicts are exacerbated by state negligence. The result is a tragic prophecy: more bloodshed as communities are pitted against each other, and a growing, unbridgeable distance between the governed and a government that refuses to see the root causes, let alone heal, the wounds it has inflicted.
In conclusion, the Somaliland government’s approach to the Awdal and Selel crisis is a textbook example of prescribing the wrong medicine for the wrong disease. By misdiagnosing a crisis of governance as a mere inter-communal squabble, it has not only abdicated its responsibility but also actively undermined the prospects for lasting peace. The path to stability does not lie in roundtable discussions between communities, but in a fundamental shift in Hargeisa’s policy towards its Issa citizens. It requires acknowledging the years of marginalization, implementing just policies, and guaranteeing equal rights and representation for all. Until the Somaliland administration is willing to cure the disease of its own unjust governance, any other prescription will be as useless as horse medicine for a donkey—an act of negligence that will inevitably lead to a deeper, more violent, and more intractable crisis.
